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Abstract  
 
 
The economic situation of all the major developed countries has changed significantly 
during the 2007-2010 period. Yet many economic policies have been kept in place. 
This is true in particular of a key measure in French government policy: tax reductions 
on overtime hours and their exemption from social charges. In this article we propose 
simulations of this scheme based on the economic context in which it is implemented. 
According to our simulations, this kind of measure is pro-cyclical and therefore poorly 
suited to the current situation of the French economy. Furthermore, even in the case of 
good conditions, the scheme would not be funded. Without financing, this measure 
would widen the deficit and would amount to a fiscal stimulus. Financing it through 
an increase in levies would radically change its nature. 
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The effectiveness of any economic policy depends on the conditions in which 
it is implemented. This obvious fact resonates even more strongly now, when 
we are experiencing a very turbulent economic situation. Decisions on 
economic policy taken before the crisis may have consequences that are 
diametrically opposed to those anticipated in a different economic context. 
Unfortunately, however obvious this may be, it is not properly taken into 
account in the econometric models used for ex ante evaluations of economic 
policies. These models are instead based on equations predicting linear 
behaviour that is independent of the position in the economic cycle. 
In this article, we propose enriching the macroeconometric model used by the 
OFCE (emod.fr) by making certain behaviours depend on the economic 
context (Section 1). We then propose conducting an evaluation in different 
economic situations of a measure devised before the crisis, i.e., tax allowances 
on overtime hours and their exemption from social charges, which is a central 
plank in French government policy. Concretely, compensation for additional 
hours worked beyond a threshold of 35 hours per week is now increased by 
25%, regardless of the size of the enterprise, is subject to neither income tax 
nor employee social charges, and benefits from a reduction in employer social 
charges. This measure is intended to boost the purchasing power of French 
employees while increasing their working hours and lowering labour costs. 
But does this measure, which was designed in 2007 in a context of economic 
growth and falling unemployment, have the same impact in a context of 
severe economic crisis? 
In Section 3, we offer simulations at different positions in the economic cycle 
of this provision for tax reductions on overtime, after having reviewed the 
main outlines of the scheme (Section 2). The section 4 attempt to develop an 
optimal policy with respect to working time, based on the position in the 
cycle.   
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I. Taking into account the economic cycle in variations in 
structural unemployment 
 
In the OFCE’s quarterly model, e-mod.fr, the standard Phillips equation is 
enriched by the analysis developed by Creel et al. (2011), and can be 
summarised in the following system1: 
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with  CP?    : rate of growth of consumer prices  
W?     : rate of growth of wages 
U      : unemployment rate  
U      : rate of structural or equilibrium unemployment, NAIRU  
 π   : rate of growth of labour productivity   
Outputgap    : difference between actual GDP and potential GDP   
Equation (1) is written as an error correction model of the Phillips curve in 
which the equilibrium unemployment derived from the Kalman filter is 
described in Heyer (2010).  
  
                                                 
1 In emod.fr, the consumer price is a function of the import price (PM) and the value-added 
price (PV) : ( )1
t t t CC M V P
P P Pη η ε= + − +? ? ? .  
The value-added price setting results from profit maximisation in an imperfect competitive market. 
The firm’s desired price level corresponds to a desired mark-up (Md ) over unit labour costs (CU). 
 
t
d
V tP CU M= + , with tt t C tCU W T π= + −  where TC is the employer’s social contribution 
rate. 
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Box: e-mod.fr 
The OFCE’s quarterly model, e-mod.fr2, focuses on the study of the French economy 
and uses the framework provided by the national accounts. This model is used to 
analyse macroeconomic, fiscal and budgetary policies. It is also used as a tool to 
analyse the economic situation and for short-term forecasting and medium-term 
simulations. The model has a rigorous accounting framework and uses behavioural 
equations for the forecasting exercises. The productive sector is broken down into 
seven branches (agriculture and agribusiness, energy, manufacturing, construction and 
public works, commerce, market services and non-market services), and five agents 
are distinguished (households, corporations and quasi-corporations, financial 
institutions, government, and the rest of the world). 
The model is built on the assumption of an economy functioning on neo-Keynesian 
lines. In periods of underutilisation of production capacity, aggregate demand 
(consumption, investment, inventory changes and exports) constrains supply and 
determines short-term production. However, this model of demand is tempered by 
the fact that the level of production interacts with price and thus with demand 
behaviour. A decline in production reduces employment, so much so that the number 
of unemployed increases. The production capacity utilisation rate decreases. The 
easing of pressure on the market for labour and goods and services reduces 
production costs, and thus prices, which tends to restore demand. 
Supply conditions have a short-term influence on foreign trade via competitiveness and 
the pressures on production capacity, and on consumption, through inflation. The 
dynamics take into account inventory behaviour. Finally, in the medium term, the 
model returns to a more classic dynamic, with a steady state regulated by equilibrium 
unemployment.  
 
Equation (2) describes the process of change in structural unemployment, 
which, in its simplest version, follows a random walk (King et al. (1995), 
Gordon (1997)). The standard, purely stochastic specification of structural 
unemployment cannot, however, explain its fluctuations. Moreover, most 
studies do not attempt to predict how it changes in the future, and thus shy 
away from making any economic policy recommendations to reduce its level 
(Richardson et al., 2000; Irac, 2000; Boone et al., 2001; and Laubach, 2001).  
A number of studies (McMorrow and Roeger, 2000; Heyer and Timbeau, 
2002; Logeay and Tober, 2003; Slacalek, 2003; Heyer, Reynes and 
Sterdyniak, 2007) have attempted to overcome the limitations of the standard 
model by enriching the dynamics of structural unemployment. From this 
starting point, these efforts limit the influence of the unobserved variable to 
the short term and define structural unemployment from the combined 
                                                 
2 For further information, the reader can turn to Chauvin et al. (2002). 
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dynamic of exogenous variables, such as unemployment (U), 10-year real 
interest rates (i) and labour productivity (π)3.  
The basic model is thus enriched by these exogenous variables. This model is 
very similar to those formulated and estimated in Heyer and Timbeau (2002) 
and Heyer et al. (2007). 
In these studies, a slowdown in productivity leads, all else being equal, to an 
increase in the equilibrium rate of unemployment. The long-term elasticity 
estimated in various studies on the French economy lies between -0.5 and -
0.1: increasing productivity by 1 point reduces the equilibrium 
unemployment rate by 0.1 to 0.5 point. The comparable estimate for long-
term real interest rates is between 0.1 and 0.6. The impact of interest rates on 
equilibrium unemployment can flow through simple channels via the user 
cost of productive capital (Bonnet and Mahfouz, 1996; Cotis, Méary and 
Sobczak, 1998) or more complex channels. For Fitoussi and Phelps (1988), 
labour demand depends on real wages, as in traditional theories, but also on 
interest rates, since they determine the price of the assets that companies wish 
to accumulate. The impact of interest rates on the rate of structural 
unemployment thus passes through the capital market. A high level of interest 
rates depresses asset prices, and hence the demand for labour, resulting in an 
increase in the equilibrium rate of unemployment. 
Finally, changes in structural unemployment depend on changes in actual 
unemployment. This idea is already found in Cross (1995) and Mankiw 
(2001). This dynamic effect can be interpreted as a hysteresis effect4 
(Blanchard and Summers, 1986): this corresponds to a long-term adjustment 
of actual unemployment towards equilibrium unemployment after a 
macroeconomic shock. The equilibrium rate of unemployment tends to 
increase with actual unemployment, explaining part of its variation (Phelps, 
1994). This kind of situation can be explained first, by the possible 
persistence of the shock, and second, by shortcomings in the adjustment 
mechanisms. Thus, following a macroeconomic shock, when unemployment 
rises, some people are excluded, and the burden of unemployment on wages 
winds up decreasing, implying higher unemployment for a given inflation. 
                                                 
3 Other determinants of equilibrium unemployment are advanced in the theoretical literature. They 
are usually deduced from a WS-PS model (minimum wage – L'Horty and Rault, 1999); replacement 
rates (Layard et al., 1991; Laffargue and Thibault, 1998); the tax wedge (Padoa-Schioppa, 1990; 
Manning, 1993; Corneo, 1994; Cotis et al., 1998); as well as all other variables (bargaining power, 
mismatch, level of competition, cost of redundancies, etc.) which have been refined by the 
theoreticians of the labour market Cahuc and Zylberberg (1996). None of these variables are 
significant at the 10% threshold and they are thus not used in the rest of this article. 
4 Some authors challenge the use of the term “hysteresis” to describe these phenomena. See 
Cross (1995) or Amable et al. (1995). 
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Conversely, when unemployment falls, the excluded are gradually reintegrated 
(either through active policies or by clearing out the queues), and the burden 
of unemployment on wages increases. The loss of human capital associated 
with periods of inactivity, which is greater as the average duration of 
unemployment increases, can also explain this kind of dynamic. 
These explanations are not the only ones possible. Any dynamic process of 
adjustment between the supply and demand for labour may also account for 
this type of relationship. For example, Lipsey (1960), following Phillips 
(1958), considered imperfectly segmented labour markets. A shortage on a 
labour micro-market (segmentation can be geographic, by profession, by 
experience, etc.) is translated into higher wages, but also into a transfer of the 
surplus labour supply on other micro-markets. These transfers have a 
particular speed, with both the level of unemployment and its rate of change 
affecting formation of the wage. This intuition can be generalised by 
including the mismatch between the supply and demand for labour. When 
qualified employees accept less-skilled jobs, it takes some time for them to see 
that the labour market is improving and that by leaving their current jobs 
they can find more suitable employment. The argument can be both for a 
finite speed of information flow as well as for a calculation that includes the 
risk of accepting a more highly-skilled job. The dynamics of job search 
models or the Lindbeck and Snower (1989) insider-outsider models and the 
link with wage dynamics can be invoked here to explain the micro-economic 
foundations of this relationship. 
In these studies, these three effects (U, i, π) are assumed to be constant, 
identical whatever the initial economic situation. Yet it is conceivable that 
these effects, especially the hysteresis effect, can be different depending on 
whether the economy is booming and close to full employment or on the 
contrary is far from its growth potential5. 
Heyer (2010) proposed to supplement this earlier work by removing the 
assumption that these effects remain constant and by enabling them to vary 
over time. 
This means taking into account the position of the economy in the business 
cycle by making the coefficients of equation (2) depend on it.  
                                                 
5 A recent study by Guichard and Rusticelli (2010) examined how the shock on aggregate 
unemployment resulting from the economic crisis can be transmitted to structural unemployment 
by the hysteresis effects that arise through the increase in long-term unemployment. The increase in 
structural unemployment resulting from the crisis was estimated to be ¾ of a percentage point for 
the OECD as a whole, but this study highlights the important differences between countries.  
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Whereas equation (2) translates the long-term changes in the equilibrium 
unemployment, equation (3) describes its dynamics. Equation (4) is the gap 
version of Okun's law (Abel and Bernanke,  2005) where ρ is the factor 
relating changes in unemployment to changes in output. 
 
II. Presentation of the measure on tax reductions on overtime 
hours 
The measure reducing taxes on overtime hours and exempting them from 
social charges applies to all employees in the public and private sectors in 
France. It covers both the complementary hours worked by part-time 
employees as well as the overtime hours performed by full-time employees, 
including those working for pay packages. It has been in force since 1 October 
2007. 
II.1 The basic principles6 
The measure has a number of components:  
A. Flat-rate reduction on employer social charges 
The measure introduces a flat-rate reduction on payroll taxes of € 1.50 per 
hour of overtime worked for companies with twenty employees or fewer and 
€ 0.50 in companies with more than twenty employees. 
B. Alignment of the overtime hours supplement 
The measure proposes aligning overtime hours at a minimum rate of plus 
25% in all companies. 
C. Exemption from income tax 
The measure allows employees to exempt all wages paid for overtime hours 
worked, within the limit of the 25% increase, from income tax. 
D. Exemption on employee social charges 
The measure also includes a reduction on employee charges equal in amount 
to the French CSG and CRDS charges as well as all other charges mandated 
by law and bargaining agreements. 
 
This measure has different implications for the overall cost of labour. Its 
impact on the cost differs depending on the size of the company and the level 
of the hourly wage. For companies with more than twenty employees, 
                                                 
6 For more on this measure, see Heyer (2007). 
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overtime costs fell once the measure was adopted. However, despite this lower 
cost, an overtime hour still costs more than a regular hour. At 1.33 times the 
French minimum wage (the “SMIC”), the cost of an overtime hour falls by 7 
to 8% and its added cost compared to a regular hour is no longer 25%, but 
15 to 16%. 
For businesses with twenty employees or fewer, the cost associated with 
aligning the increase at 25% for overtime hours breaks even at an hourly wage 
of 1.2 times the SMIC, that is to say, for a gross monthly salary of 2000 
euros. Beyond that, an overtime hour costs more after the reform than before 
it. At 1.33 times the SMIC, the average hourly wage for an overtime hour, the 
extra cost is 1.5% compared to the current situation. 
With regard to the complementary hours of part-timers, their cost falls with 
the reform, regardless of the level of the reference wage or the firm size. Also, 
unlike overtime hours, a complementary hour costs less than a regular hour. 
Finally, for businesses with more than twenty employees, this measure would 
at best lower the labour costs of their employees, whether full time or part 
time, by 0.5%. For businesses with twenty employees or fewer, the drop can 
reach up to 1.2% for their part-time employees. For full-time employees, the 
cost is very slightly less for those on up to 1.2 times the SMIC and slightly 
more beyond this (Table 1). 
     
Table 1. Impact on the cost of labour 
In % 
Wage as share of the SMIC 1 1.1 1.2 1.33 2.0 
Full-time employee       
Companies w/ • 20 workers -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Companies w/  > 20 workers -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.1 
Part-time employee       
Companies w/ • 20 workers -1.2 -1.1 -0.9 -0.8 -0.5 
Companies w/ > 20 workers -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 
Source: OFCE calculation. The calculation is based on an average situation of working hours without 
overtime of 36.3 hours per week, and of 1.3 hours of overtime per week, amounting to 58 overtime 
hours per year per employee. For part-time work, the standard week is 23 hours, to which is added 
2 complementary hours per week. 
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II.2 The goals of the measure 
The measure to cut taxes on overtime work has three objectives: to increase 
the purchasing power of those who work, to reduce labour costs, and to 
encourage a longer working week. The impact on employment is ambiguous. 
Indeed, it has overlapping contradictory effects: 
1. The first is positive and concerns the reduction in labour costs and the 
increase in employee purchasing power. Given the cheaper cost of overtime, 
companies would be encouraged to increase the working hours of existing 
employees, particularly in sectors experiencing pressure on hiring new workers 
(construction, hotels and health care). The remuneration of this overtime 
would increase purchasing power, thereby irrigating the entire economy, with 
a positive effect on employment. 
2. The second effect is negative for employment: lowering the cost of an 
extra hour encourages entrepreneurs to extend working hours, thus enhancing 
the status of insiders (employees) at the expense of outsiders (the 
unemployed). This causes an increase in the per capita productivity of French 
workers, which is positive for the potential growth of the country’s economy, 
but bad for employment in the short term. 
3. Finally, as with any tax measure, a windfall is to be feared. With the 
recovery in activity, many additional hours that would have been performed 
in any case will now be tax-free. 
 
III. Macroeconomic evaluations of the measure 
Using the elements discussed in the previous sections, it is possible to assess 
the impact on the French economy of tax reductions on overtime hours 
depending on whether this measure is introduced at the peak of the cycle or at 
the bottom. 
As we do not have the elasticity of overtime hours to their costs, we assume 
that companies will saturate the legal constraint on overtime (220 hours per 
year) for their employees who already work some overtime (37% of full-time 
employees). Working hours would increase by 0.8% for employees as a whole. 
We then evaluate the different scenarios using the OFCE macroeconomic 
model, e-mod.fr. 
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III.1. Macroeconomic impacts of the tax reductions on overtime 
hours at the peak of the cycle 
In the first simulation, we place ourselves in a favourable economic context, 
corresponding to a strongly positive output gap (3 points), as measured by the 
OECD. This was the situation observed in France in the early 1980s and 
1990s. The main findings of this simulation, summarised in Table 2, are as 
follows: 
In the very short term (1 year), there is competition between working time 
and employment: nearly 80,000 jobs would be destroyed, without stimulating 
activity. The extra income earned by those who work more is cancelled out, in 
terms of GDP, by the losses of those who no longer have jobs. In these 
circumstances, the public deficit would widen by 0.4 percentage point of 
GDP, and the unemployment rate would rise by 0.3 point. 
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Table 2. Impact of the tax reductions on overtime hours at the peak of the 
cycle7 
Difference from the central account, in % 
year 1 2 3 4 5 10
Total GDP (in volume) 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Imports -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.2
Household spending -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.6
Government expenditure 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Corporate investment 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 0.0
Exports 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.6
Contributions to growth      
Change in inventory 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Domestic demand -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3
Trade balance 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
Consumer prices -0.2 -0.6 -0.9 -1.0 -1.1 -1.1
GDP price -0.3 -0.7 -1.1 -1.2 -1.3 -1.3
Duration of work 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Household income 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5
Total productivity per capita 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Total workforce (1000s) -79 -48 -25 -7 13 64
Total workforce (%) -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3
ILO unemployment rate (in 
points) 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2
Household savings rate 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.0
Business margin rates 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
Financing capacity (pts of GDP)      
Non-financial companies 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Financial companies 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
General government -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2
Households & self-employed 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5
Non-profits serving households 
(“ISBLSMs”) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Trade 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3
Sources: Quarterly accounts, INSEE, author’s calculations    
                                                 
7 In this simulation, the peak of the cycle corresponds to an output gap of 3 points as measured by 
the OECD. 
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This increase in the unemployment rate would cause a fall in prices of 
0.2 percentage point. Five years from now, this could be expected to be 1.1 
points. This would enable additional growth of 0.4%, driven by domestic 
demand. Household consumption would be stimulated by growth in real 
income. Part of this extra income would be saved by households – the savings 
rate would rise by 0.2 percentage point – while the rest would be consumed.  
Due to the expansionary impact of this measure and the very slight reduction 
in labour costs, it would create 13,000 jobs over the next 5 years, which is not 
enough to generate a reduction in unemployment. 
The expansionary impact would not be enough to fund the measure. The 
government deficit would worsen by 0.2 percentage point of GDP over the 
next 5 years. 
In the long term, there would be just over 64,000 jobs created, representing a 
slight decline in the unemployment rate (-0.2 point). But the measure would 
still not be funded: the extra growth of 0.5% would be accompanied by a 
widening deficit of 0.2 percentage point of GDP. 
 
III.2.Macroeconomic impacts of the tax reductions on overtime hours 
in a normal economic situation 
In contrast to the previous situation, in normal conditions, corresponding to a 
zero output gap, the equilibrium rate of unemployment varies with changes in 
unemployment with an elasticity of less than one (0.9). The disinflationary 
trend observed in the previous case would now be less pronounced (Table 3). 
This would not call completely into question the increase in household 
purchasing power or the increase in the competitiveness of the French 
economy, but it would limit their extent. The extra growth would be 0.2 
percentage point at 5 years (0.3 point at 10 years). The measure still would 
not be funded, since the deficit would widen by 0.4 percentage point (0.3 
point at 10 years). 
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Table 3. Impact of the tax reductions on overtime hours in a normal 
economic situation8 
Difference from the central account, in % 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 10
Total GDP (in volume) 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3
Imports -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4
Household spending -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.6
Government expenditure 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Corporate investment 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Exports 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Contributions to growth      
Change in inventory 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Domestic demand 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4
Trade balance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1
Consumer prices 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4
GDP price 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.6
Duration of work 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Household income 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6
Total productivity per capita 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Total workforce (1000s) -80 -75 -70 -64 -56 -20
Total workforce (%) -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1
ILO unemployment rate (in 
points) 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1
Household savings rate 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.1
Business margin rates 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Financing capacity (pts of GDP)      
Non-financial companies 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Financial companies 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
General government -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3
Households & self-employed 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4
Non-profits serving households 
(“ISBLSMs”) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Trade 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Sources: Quarterly accounts, INSEE, author’s calculations 
 
                                                 
8 In this simulation, the peak of the cycle corresponds to an output gap of 0 as measured by the 
OECD. 
 14 
III.3. Macroeconomic impacts of the tax reductions on overtime 
hours at the bottom of the cycle 
In the last simulation, the tax reduction on overtime is enacted in an 
economic climate that has seriously deteriorated, corresponding to a negative 
output gap (-3 points). 
In a situation like this, with the kind of mass unemployment experienced in 
France in the late 1980s and 1990s, and as is once again the case, the 
hysteresis effect is strong. An increase in the duration of work in this context 
has a negative impact on employment (-72,000 jobs at 5 years and -125,000 
at 10 years, see Table 4). The unemployment rate increases slightly (0.3 
percentage point at 5 years, 0.4 point at 10 years). This measure has little 
impact on growth (0.1 percentage point at 5 years and 0.1 point at 10 years) 
and is not funded: the deficit would deteriorate by 0.4 point at 5 years (0.4 
point at 10 years). 
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Table 4. Impact of the tax reductions on overtime hours at the bottom of the 
cycle9 
Difference from the central account, in % 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 10
Total GDP (in volume) 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Imports -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.6
Household spending -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Government spending 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Corporate investment 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.4 0.7
Exports 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.4
Contributions to growth      
Changes in inventory 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Domestic demand -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4
Trade balance 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3
Consumer prices -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 0.2 0.4 1.4
GDP price -0.2 -0.5 -0.3 0.2 0.5 1.6
Duration of work 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Household income 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9
Total productivity per capita 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Total workforce (1000s) -79 -73 -69 -68 -72 -96
Total workforce (%) -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4
ILO unemployment rate (in 
points) 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Household savings rate 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
Business margin rate 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Financing capacity (in points of 
GDP)      
Non-financial companies 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Financial companies 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
General government -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Households & self-employed 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3
Non-profits serving households 
(“ISBLSMs”) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Trade 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sources: Quarterly accounts, INSEE, author’s calculations 
 
                                                 
9 In this simulation, the bottom of the cycle corresponds to an output gap of -3 points as measured 
by the OECD. 
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III.4. What increase for the working week? 
In the preceding simulations, we have assumed that companies reached the 
limits of the legal constraints on overtime (220 hours per year) for their 
employees who already work some overtime (37% of full-time employees). 
Working hours would increase by 0.8% for employees as a whole. 
But it is conceivable that business could make greater use of overtime and that 
the percentage of employees who work overtime could also increase. 
We then conducted further simulations with up to a 2.5% increase of 
working hours for employees as a whole. 
The results of these simulations at 5 years are summarised in Table 5: the 
more firms use overtime, the greater the sensitivity to the economic situation. 
The cost to public finances increases along with the duration of the work 
week and the worsening of the economic situation, ex-ante of course but also 
ex-post. 
 
Table 5. Summary of the impact at 5 years based on the increase in the 
work week 
Difference from the central account, in % 
Increase in the work week of … …0.8 % … 1 % … 2.5 % 
 Bottom of 
cycle 0.1 0.1 0.3 
GDP Normal cycle  0.2 0.2 0.5 
 Top of cycle 0.4 0.4 1.1 
 Bottom of 
cycle -72 -90 -224 
Employment 
(1000s)  
Normal cycle 
-56 -70 -175 
 Top of cycle 13 17 41 
 Bottom of 
cycle 0.3 0.3 0.8 
Unemployment 
rate 
Normal cycle 
0.2 0.3 0.6 
 Top of cycle -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 
 Bottom of 
cycle -0.4 -0.5 -1.3 
Gov’t deficit 
(% of GDP) 
Normal cycle 
-0.4 -0.5 -1.2 
 Top of cycle -0.2 -0.3 -0.8 
Sources: Quarterly accounts, INSEE, author’s calculations 
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IV. What is the optimal economic policy? 
A tax reduction on overtime work and its exemption from social charges 
would thus differ in its impact on the economy, depending on the market 
conditions prevailing at the time the measure is applied (Table 5). According 
to our simulations, this measure is pro-cyclical and therefore poorly suited to 
an economic slump such as exists in France today. Also, note that even in the 
case of a good situation, lower labour costs and the elimination of payroll 
taxes are expensive and are not funded. Without funding, this measure would 
widen the deficit and amount to a fiscal stimulus, an inappropriate policy 
during the peak of a cycle. 
The next two sections attempt to develop an optimal policy with respect to 
working time, based on the position in the cycle.   
IV.1 During a cyclical peak 
In a booming economy, as the jobless rate falls and full employment is 
approached, a supply policy is effective. From this point of view, increasing 
working hours through the tax exemption of overtime may be one option to 
consider. It is necessary to ascertain, however, that, once the measure is 
funded, it would still have a positive impact on activity and employment. The 
issue would then shift to the choice of the instrument to be selected for 
funding. 
According to our previous simulations, in the case of a moderate 0.8% 
increase in working hours, the funding effort would be 0.5 percentage point 
of GDP at 5 years and 0.2 point at 10 years. 
This funding could be provided by higher levies. This would radically change 
the nature of the measure. Financing it through other social charges or by a 
VAT increase would lead among other things to an increase in the production 
costs that are being lightened. This would also accentuate the differential 
effects between the taxation of overtime hours and of normal hours. With this 
type of financing, the measure’s impact would be neutral at 5 years but still 
positive at 10 years (Table 6): additional growth would come to 0.4 point 
over this period, with the creation of about 50,000 additional jobs, which 
would result in a slight decline in the unemployment rate (-0.2 point). 
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Table 6. Summary of the impact at 5 years and 10 years based on how the 
measure is financed * 
Difference from the central account (%) 
Measure funded by …  5 yrs  10 yrs 
 GDP 0 0.4 
… a VAT increase Employment -51 50 
 Unemployment rate 0.2 -0.2 
 GDP -0.1 0.4 
… an increase in employer social 
charges  
Employment 
-67 57 
 Unemployment rate 0.3 -0.2 
 GDP 0.2 0.5 
… an increase in income tax Employment -16 89 
 Unemployment rate 0 -0.4 
 GDP -0.2 0.4 
… a reduction in social spending Employment -71 46 
 Unemployment rate 0.3 -0.2 
* We have used a 0.8% increase in working time here. 
Sources: emod.fr, author’s calculations 
 
With funding through income tax or the CSG (general social contribution) or 
a similar levy, the measure would lead to a transfer of levies on economic 
activity to capital income. According to our simulations, this type of financing 
would be the most optimal, as the impact on GDP at 5 years would remain 
positive (0.2 point). At ten years, the additional growth would be 0.5 point, 
nearly 90,000 jobs would be created, and the unemployment rate would 
decline by 0.4 point. 
There is one last track for financing: to lower social spending. This solution 
seems less advantageous than the preceding one at 5 years, since it would 
negate the positive effects of the tax exemption of overtime. Job losses would 
amount to 71,000, and the unemployment rate would rise by 0.3 point. At 
10 years, the impact of this track would be similar to the previous ones, while 
still being less advantageous. 
IV.2 During an economic downturn 
During an economic downturn, as in the recent period, the tax exemption of 
overtime clearly is inappropriate and counter-productive. Faced with an 
unexpected negative shock, firms usually start by reducing working time and 
then cut back on precarious jobs, and in particular their temporary workers, 
before finally proceeding with redundancies. 
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Figure 1.  Comparison of trends in working time and value added during 
the last two recessions in France  
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Sources: INSEE, author’s calculations 
 
However, during this crisis, the shock absorber role played by working time in 
France was less potent with respect both to other developed countries and to 
previous recessions in France, in particular the downturn in the early 1990s 
(Figure 1). More specifically, the magnitude of the decrease in working time 
was similar in the two periods of crisis, even though the slowdown in activity 
was three times greater during the recent period. 
This difference in behaviour, despite a turn to partial unemployment, may be 
related to the implementation of the tax exemption of overtime. 
In a cyclical downturn, two alternatives to the tax exemption of overtime 
should have been implemented. 
IV.2.1 A reduction in working hours 
The first is to reduce working time. This was the strategy adopted during the 
recent crisis especially by Germany and to a lesser degree Italy (Figure 2). The 
reduction in working time was exceptional in both countries, both in its scale 
and in its duration. 
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Figure 2.  Comparison of trends in working time during the 
2008 recession 
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Sources: OECD, author’s calculations 
 
These countries have opted for a sustained reduction in working hours in 
order to safeguard jobs. They extended their arrangements for partial 
unemployment and have drawn on more conventional mechanisms (time 
savings accounts, reduction of overtime, negotiations of reductions in working 
hours). In mid-2010, their levels of working hours per employee were still 
well below the pre-crisis level. In Italy, working hours have fallen by nearly 
4% (5% in industry), mainly due to the spread of partial unemployment. As 
for Germany, it has a set of mechanisms for modulating the working hours, 
including time savings accounts – which can have negative balances – partial 
unemployment, and especially branch agreements negotiated within 
companies, all of which make it possible to safeguard jobs in return for wage 
cuts and reductions in working time. In the metallurgy sector, for example, a 
collective agreement on job security enabled companies to reduce the work 
week from 35 hours to 29 hours, with an equivalent decline in wages (15%), 
in return for stability in employment. Nevertheless, the almost total lack of 
any adjustment in employment during this crisis is exceptional: despite a 
collapse in GDP of almost 6%, employment has remained stable since the 
crisis began, and the unemployment rate has not budged. The reason is in 
essence the extension and increased flexibility of the arrangements for partial 
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unemployment (Kurzarbeit), which affected up to 1.5 million employees in 
the second quarter of 2009. Partial unemployment helped to keep 1.2 million 
employees in jobs in Germany in that year. This amounted to a wager on the 
future by the government and German business, which overwhelmingly 
supported the use of this arrangement despite the cost incurred in order to 
keep intact production capacity and the skills level of the work force, in the 
prospect of an imminent recovery. 
IV.2.2 A pick-up in demand 
The second alternative is a Keynesian demand stimulus. At the bottom of the 
economic cycle, characterised by a lack of demand relative to supply, a policy 
like this will have a lasting effect, as it is non-inflationary, with structural 
unemployment falling alongside actual unemployment.10 The stimulus 
multiplier is of course not sufficient to fund such a policy, but it has a 
stronger impact on economic growth and jobs than does a supply policy such 
as the tax exemption of overtime. 
We simulated different stimulus policies by calibrating them to a deficit 
increase at 5 and 10 yrs that is identical to that generated by the tax 
exemption of overtime at the bottom of the cycle, namely, a deterioration of 
0.5 percentage point of GDP. 
Three stimulus instruments were selected (social benefits, public investment 
and subsidised jobs in the non-profit sector). The simulated increase with 
these instruments was calibrated so as to observe a deterioration of 0.5 
percentage point of GDP in the public deficit at 5 years and 10 years, i.e., an 
increase of 1 percentage point of GDP for each instrument. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 In a recent study, Creel et al. (2011) showed that fiscal multipliers differ depending on the 
economy’s position in the cycle when the measure is implemented. According to them, during an 
economic downturn the fiscal multipliers are strong, as will be the expansionary effects of a 
stimulus policy.  
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Table 7. Summary of the impact at 1 year, 5 years and 10 years of various 
measures worsening the public deficit by 0.5 GDP point * 
Difference from the central account (%) 
  1 yr  5 yrs  10 yrs 
 GDP 0 0.1 0.1 
Tax exemption of overtime 
** 
Employment 
-79 -72 -108 
 Unemployment 
rate 0.3 0.3 0.4 
 GDP 1.0 1.1 1.1 
Increase in social benefits Employment 95 145 153 
 Unemployment 
rate -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 
 GDP 1.3 1.1 1.0 
Increase in public investment Employment 184 226 204 
 Unemployment 
rate -0.7 -0.9 -0.8 
 GDP 1.3 1.2 1.1 
Increase in subsidised jobs in 
the non-profit sector  
Employment 
317 229 127 
 Unemployment 
rate -1.2 -0.9 -0.5 
*   It is assumed here that the economy is at the bottom of the cycle. 
** We have used a 0.8% increase in working time. 
 
Sources: emod.fr, author’s calculations 
 
The results are summarised in Table 7. The first lesson is that, regardless of 
the stimulus instrument chosen, in a context of weak economic activity the 
policy has positive results on economic growth and employment in both the 
short term and long term. Unlike the tax exemption of overtime hours, which 
destroyed 79,000 to 108,000 jobs at 1 year and 10 years, respectively, a 
stimulus policy creates massive employment given an identical deterioration 
in public finances. The second lesson is that, in the short term, what appears 
to be most effective in terms of reducing unemployment is a stimulus based 
on subsidised jobs in the non-profit sector (-1.2 point at 1 year). In the longer 
term, at the 10 year horizon, the optimal choice of stimulus instrument seems 
to be public investment, which creates more than 200,000 jobs, thus 
generating a 0.8 point decline in unemployment.   
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V. Conclusion 
The economic impact of a tax reduction on overtime and its exemption from 
social security charges would differ depending on the market conditions 
prevailing at the time that the measure is applied. 
In a favourable economic environment, an increase in working time prompted 
by lower labour costs and the elimination of payroll taxes would seem 
appropriate. It is of course not funded, and financing it through higher levies 
would radically change its nature, even though this would not call into 
question its positive impact on employment and unemployment. 
However, this measure is poorly suited to the kind of economic downturn 
being experienced by the French economy today. This corroborates the results 
of a recent study by Cochard et al. (2011). These authors examined data 
involving 35 sectors of the French economy and estimated that a 1% increase 
in overtime would destroy about 6,500 jobs in the commercial sector (i.e., 
0.04% of commercial jobs), three-quarters of which would be temporary jobs. 
Thus, in a context of severe economic crisis, it seems that an incentive to work 
more would hurt employment, especially temporary employment. 
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